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DISCRETION IN THE CAREER AND RECOGNITION JUDICIARY
NICHOLAS L. GEORGAKOPOULOS t
The author compares the career judiciary that is common in legal systems
based on the continental European model with the recognition judiciary of
some common law countries. This comparison of the incentives judges face
and of the features that the selection process rewards in judicial candidates,
shows the career judiciary tends to narrowly apply the law while the
recognition judiciary tends to perceive interpretive latitude and exercise judicial
discretion. The conclusion suggests introducing features of the recognition
judiciary into career judiciary systems together with institutional features that
will prevent discretion divorced from social preferences, mores, and needs.
I. INTRODUCTION
A review of the judicial function should study in detail the institutional
setting of the judiciary. Judges, like any group, are subject to the incentive
structure of their environment. Exceptions will always exist, but rarely do
judges perform in contravention of their incentives. The importance of
promotion within the complex institutional structure of the judiciary is
striking. The two legal systems in which I have worked differ markedly in this
respect. I received my first law degree in Greece. Greece follows the continental
European model of a career judiciary, where judges start at a low position soon
after graduating from law school and are promoted to senior positions on the
basis of their performance. I received my graduate degrees in the United States,
where I now teach. The United States follows the common law model of a
recognition judiciary, where judges are appointed late in their careers, after a
full career as practitioners or academics. Judges are appointed to specific courts
and face very long odds of reaching the highest court. This I will call the
recognition judiciary, in contrast to the career judiciary, because judicial
t Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. I wish to thank Lofty Becker, Paul Berman,
Mark Janis, Rick Kay, and Mark Ramseyer for their invaluable comments. An earlier version of this paper
was presented at the University of Connecticut Law School Colloquium and benefited from comments
there.
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appointment constitutes, in part, recognition of the judge's previous career.'
Because many jurisdictions choose either career or recognition judges, a
comparative study is necessary.
The jurists who most readily accept the cynical realization that individuals
respond to the incentives of their institutional environment are scholars of
economic analysis of law. Numerous scholars study judicial conduct directly or
indirectly through a study of judicial motives.2 They are all American, however,
and only one team does comparative work. Professors J. Mark Ramseyer and
Eric Rasmusen present empirical studies of the Japanese career judiciary. They
report that Japanese judges who in their youth joined leftist organizations were
likely to receive less attractive judicial positions than their colleagues; that
judges who decided against the government ran the risk of transfers to
unattractive posts; and that judges who declared crucial parts of electoral law
unconstitutional received less attractive posts than those who did not.' They
also report that judges who convict and are reversed on appeal do not suffer
any career penalty, while judges who acquit suffer a career penalty even if the
acquittal is not reversed, and even more so if it is reversed.' Ramseyer's own
explanation for the paradoxical difference between Japan and the United States
is the expected ending to a repeated game of cooperation or defection (often
referred to as the "prisoner's dilemma").' Ramseyer argues that in the United
States, politicians do not expect to stay in power long, because no party holds
power for long, but they expect the system to survive. Politicians in such an
environment favor strong independent courts to preserve the politicians'
influence after an electoral loss, even though strong courts limit their influence
1. Numerous other judicial systems exist or can be devised. In many U.S. jurisdictions, for example,
judges are elected. In other settings judges are specialists, often without legal education.
2. Chief Judge Richard A. Posner has had the most to say on this topic. See Richard A. Posner,
Overcoming Law 1-168 (Harvard 1995). In Overcoming Law, Posner discusses the structure of the legal
profession, that of the legal academy in the U.S., and that of the judiciary. Id at 109-44. He has collected
and discussed numerous works on judicial incentives in the economic analysis of law tradition. The
motivating factors that surface are prestige, popularity, avoidance of reversal, reputation and citations,
contribution to the shape of society (akin to a voter's enjoyment or civic pride), and spectator's enjoyment.
Other authors in the economic analysis of law who have engaged the subject are Robert D. Cooter, Jeffrey
N. Gordon, Richard S. Higgins and Paul H. Rubin, Bruce H. Kobayashi and John R. Lott, Jr., Lewis A.
Kornhauser, William M. Landes (with Posner), Thomas J. Miceli and Metin M. Cosgel, Erin O'Hara, J.
Mark Ramseyer, Eric Rasmusen, and Edward P. Schwartz. All of the authors are products of U.S. legal
and/or economic education. Of the listed authors, the only ones whose work is comparative are Ramseyer
and Rasmusen, as discussed below.
3. See J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The
Evidence tom Japan, 13 J L Econ & Org 259 (1997).
4. See J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High? (draft,
1998).
5. See J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J Legal
Stud 721 (1994).
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while in power. In Japan, the governing party is unlikely to lose in elections
(the Liberal Democratic Party has long been in power) and has little reason to
limit its power through independent courts. In Imperial Japan's democracy,
parties changed, but none expected the system to survive for long. Hence there
was little to gain by reducing political power and retaining influence after a
loss. This explanation, however, cannot apply to other career judiciary
jurisdictions. For example, in the post-World War II environment, German,
Belgian, Dutch, and Italian politicians had every reason to believe the system
would survive, but little expectation of their party retaining power.
Generalizing Ramseyer's point leads one to overlook or trivialize a
fundamental difference between a career and a recognition judiciary.
Ramseyer's theory may accurately explain variations of independence and
ensuing judicial discretion within career judiciary and recognition judiciary
jurisdictions. If, however, it is used for a cross comparison of the two systems,
it would fail because a host of incentives distort the comparison. On average, I
expect jurisdictions with a career judiciary to produce an ex ante expectation of
less judicial discretion and independence than jurisdictions with a recognition
judiciary. However, some career jurisdictions with expansive judicial discretion
(for example, Germany) may well exhibit greater discretion than recognition
jurisdictions with narrow judicial discretion (for example, the United
Kingdom).
Part II of this article defines the two judicial systems. Part III attempts to
determine the incentives they provide to their members. Part IV concludes
with an analysis of judicial independence and discretion in the two systems.
Assuming that judicial discretion is desirable-which is strongly contested-
several policy recommendations spring forth. The authority of any branch of
government (including the judiciary itself) to transfer judges should be
considered contrary to a constitution that requires an independent judiciary.
The number of judges in first instance courts should be very large compared to
the number of appellate judges, and highest courts must be as few as possible,
each with a very small number of judges.7 Promotions to higher courts should
6. I have supported judicial discretion in Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Predictability and Legal
Evolution, 17 Ind Rev L & Econ 475 (1997). For its numerous opponents see, for example, Lino A. Graglia,
"Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 Stan L Rev 1019 (1992) (supporting narrow powers of
judicial review and Robert Bork's arguments in The Tempting ofAmerica: The Political Seduction of Law);
Raoul Berger, Insulation ofJudicial Usurpation: A Comment on Lawrence Sager's "Court-Stripping Polemic",
44 Oh St LJ 611 (1983).
7. Jurisdictions of continental Europe have different administrative, civil and other highest courts, each
often much larger than the nine-member single U.S. Supreme Court and state supreme courts of similar
size. Germany has five highest courts. See Mauro Cappeletti, TheJudicial Process in Comparative Perspective
49 n 132. France, Germany and Italy have over one hundred supreme court judges in each of the several
supreme courts. See id at 49 & n 133.
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be based on elements other than judicial performance; perhaps a pure seniority
promotion to the appellate court and a qualitative selection from that to the
highest court would be sufficient. Finally, once judicial discretion and
independence is induced, mechanisms to channel that independence towards
increasing social welfare should be considered.
In reviewing independence, however, we must not forget that its expansion
trespasses on two other values of the legal and political system, accountability
and democratic legitimacy. Accountability and legitimacy decrease as judges'
independence increases. As soon as mechanisms for accountability and
legitimacy enter, the possibility arises that judges will be held accountable not
for dereliction of their duties but for exercising their discretion in a way that
may be obnoxious to current political powers. This fear can be mitigated
through the design of structures that control accountability and legitimacy
while maintaining independence, but a trace of it will be present regardless. It
is important to note that the mechanisms for social sensitivity discussed in the
conclusion may be considered part of or substitutes for other mechanisms of
the democratic legitimacy of the judiciary.
I1. CAREER AND RECOGNITION JUDICIAL STRUCTURES
The differences between the two structures are not only numerous, but
they also depend on the details of how each judicial structure is formulated in
each jurisdiction. Even within a jurisdiction, subsidiary judicial structures may
be fashioned in a manner different from other parts of the judiciary. A typical
example is the constitutional courts of several civil law countries, which have
some recognition features inside jurisdictions that generally follow the career
model.' Such discrepancies will also exist when a parent jurisdiction is a
supranational coalition joining jurisdictions that may follow different
approaches on judicial structure, such as the European Union or the North
American Free Trade Agreement. Given the variety of the implementations of
each style of judicial structure, the comparison that I will attempt to make can
only be a comparison of archetypes. The comparison will be based on the terms
and arrangements most representative of each system. By their very definition,
the archetypes may not exist in pure form anywhere, since each jurisdiction
that joins each classification (career or recognition) may have chosen to deviate
8. Germany, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Austria, and Belgium are the European jurisdictions with
separate constitutional courts. Their judges are appointed at ages averaging between fifty to sixty by the
legislature from the non-judicial branches of the legal profession. Their terms are not usually renewable and
vary from six to twelve years (from Portugal to Germany). See Nicos C. Alivizatos, Judges as Veto Players, in
Herbert Doering, ed, Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe 566 (St. Martin's 1995).
[7:205
Discretion in Career and Recognition Judiciary 209
in some detail from the archetypal structure it has chosen. This comparison of
archetypes will, hopefully, assist future comparisons of specific systems.
Without further caveats, let us try to describe each archetype in turn.
A. THE ARCHETYPAL CAREER JUDICIARY
The essence of a career judiciary is that judges are appointed to junior
positions and are gradually promoted to senior positions. Senior positions
typically include seats on the supreme court and special offices in the supreme
court. Junior positions often correspond to judgeships in trial courts of first
instance. In some career judiciary structures, junior judges may not sit on trial
courts but may assist senior judges. The promotion track includes senior
positions entitled to such assistants. The archetype, therefore, of a career
judiciary means that judges' careers start early in the lower courts and that they
have a reasonable expectation of being promoted to higher courts, contingent
upon their performance. Notably, the life tenure of career judges does not
attach to a specific court. Also notable is the great number of supreme court
judges.
Career judiciary systems will most often assign life tenure to judicial
positions. Tenure, however, may be awarded after a period during which the
performance of the candidate is under review. The exact form of tenure in each
judicial system will be crucial for its operation. Notable details include whether
tenure protects from reduction in salary, from demotion to a lower court, or
from transfer to a different court of equal seniority. The mechanism by which
cases are assigned may also influence judges. If, for example, the chief judge has
the power to assign cases, the chief may punish or reward a judge without any
formal demotion or transfer. Random or sequential assignment of opinions
would prevent this method of discipline. A full examination of the merits of
different methods of opinion assignment is a different subject, unrelated to the
comparison of career and recognition systems
9. See Richard A. Posner, Cardozo:A Study in Reputation 145-47 (Chicago 1990), where Posner briefly
discusses merits and drawbacks of assignment by rotation without reaching a conclusion. A drawback is that
cases are not directed to the specialist in each area. Advantages are that in absence of specialization each
judge performs a more idiosyncratic analysis that may lead to more innovative interpretations and a true
discussion rather than the following of the specialist. Rotation increases the independence of each judge,
since performance does not depend on having the favor of the chief judge. By the same token, rotation
facilitates the comparison of judicial performance among members of the same court. Rotation makes case
selection objective and, thus, reduces resentment and induces collegiality.
20001
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B. THE ARCHETYPAL RECOGNITION JUDICIARY
The essence of the recognition judiciary is that judicial appointments are
made after the candidates have already had their first legal career, that judges
have life tenure in a specific court, and that the probability of promotion to a
higher court is very small. Appointments may be made either by a combined
action of the legislature and the executive or through a direct election, although
elected judges usually do not fit the archetype because they do not have life
tenure. One might have the impression that most common law jurisdictions
have recognition judiciaries, but this archetype is probably representative of
much fewer jurisdictions, particularly since most states in the U.S. have an
elected judiciary. Moreover, institutional features that produce judicial
incentives similar to a career judiciary may influence a system that is nominally
considered a recognition judiciary.
Once an appointment to the recognition judiciary is made, the rarity of
promotion to the next higher court influences judicial incentives. The single
supreme court of recognition jurisdictions, with its nine or even fewer judges,
produces a minuscule number of supreme court judges compared to the
multiple supreme courts of career systems, each with tens or hundreds of
judges. Thus, the recognition judiciary has a disproportionately smaller ratio of
higher court to lower court judges. This leads to vastly smaller probability of
promotion to the supreme court in recognition systems. The probability of
promotion in recognition systems is further reduced by the fact that academics
and practitioners may be appointed to appellate courts or to the supreme court
without prior judicial service.
Many state judicial systems elect their judges for limited periods of time.
This constitutes a radical departure from the concept that, once appointed, the
recognition judiciary will not be reviewed. Elections serve as a mechanism of
review of the judiciary by the electorate. The threat of removal by the
electorate produces significant incentives that judges with life tenure do not
have. Because the elected judiciary is such a departure from the norm of the
recognition judiciary, for the purposes of this discussion, it will not be
considered part of that structure's archetype, despite its prevalence in a
majority of U.S. jurisdictions. This does not mean, of course, that the elected
judiciary's incentives do not vary with the norms and institutional structure of
each jurisdiction. Rules that shield sitting judges from contested elections, or
that prevent some candidates from running for office may change judicial
incentives significantly, but they will not be studied here. The archetype of the
recognition judiciary will be considered here to be the life appointment of the
U.S. federal judges and of judges in some Atlantic and Northeastern states.
[7:205
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Recognition judiciary jurisdictions can assign judges to specific courts, as is
the custom in the U.S. As a result, the fear of a lateral reappointment,
advantageous or disgraceful, which is present in the career judiciary, is absent
from the recognition judiciary. Scholars have noted that nothing prevents the
creation of a single U.S. federal appellate court, in which transfers would be
controlled by the political machinery."
Recognition judiciary jurisdictions show marked differences in the
appointment of the chief judge. Some use a rotation system, in others a branch
of government other than the judiciary appoints the chief, while in some cases
the chief is selected by the court itself. Since much of this variety is also found
in career systems, the method of section of the chief judge, while potentially
significant, is not coextensive with the comparison of career and recognition
judicial systems.
The study of the archetypes can expand to include ever more features of
the legal system. For example, the ease with which the legislature (or the
populace through referenda) can overturn judicial interpretations of statutes
and, through a constitutional amendment, of the constitution, also influences
the liberty that judges have to use their discretion. The discussion of legislation
and constitutional amendments as judicial incentives, however, takes us quite
far from the influence of the structure of the judiciary on judicial independence
and discretion. It is time to return to the study of the incentives that the two
systems provide.
III. INCENTIVES THAT THE TWO SYSTEMS PROVIDE
The overarching difference in the incentives that the two structures
produce flows from the fact that in the recognition judiciary, judges' careers do
not depend much on evaluations of their judicial performance. Without cause,
judges cannot be discharged or transferred, and promotions are very unlikely.
By contrast, the career of the judge in a career judiciary will strongly depend on
evaluations of the judge's work at judging. In addition to direct incentives, the
shape of judicial careers will influence the sense of collegiality between judges.
The frequently reappointed career judge is likely not to feel as close to
colleagues as the permanent recognition judge. Judicial performance will not
depend only on the incentives produced by the career structure and collegiality
10. See Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts at 731-32 (cited in note 5). William M.
Landes and Richard A. Posner analyze the unusually small amount of judicial interference by the executive
in the U.S. judicial system in terms of a commitment enhancing mechanism (the one Ramseyer later used in
comparing the U.S. and Japan). Independent courts enable politicians to implement policies that will be
subsequendy enforced even if the politicians lose in following elections. See Landes and Posner, The
Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J L & Econ 875, 879 (1975).
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of judges but also on which jurists are attracted to, and selected for, the
judiciary. The issue, as far as judicial performance is concerned, is to determine
the effects that career incentives, collegiality bonds, and selection effects have
on the judiciary.
A. JUDGES' CAREER INCENTIVES
A junior judge in a career judiciary is certainly aware that the favor of
senior judges is valuable. Junior judges can avoid annoying senior judges in two
obvious ways. First, they can follow the interpretations that higher courts
adopt. Second, they can write opinions and maintain records in such a fashion
that their decisions can be reviewed easily and quickly. Evidence that can be
attributed to these two incentives is easy to find in continental European legal
systems. Innovative interpretation by lower courts is much rarer than in most
U.S. jurisdictions. Moreover, recognition courts tend to distinguish minute
factual differences from previous cases much more often than their career
counterparts. Thus, recognition judges more easily find themselves in unique
new settings, in "first-impression territory," where their interpretive latitude is
less bound by precedential restraints. By contrast, a habit of frequent
distinguishing would produce innovation by lower courts that may irk
appellate judges. Not only would easy distinguishing allow lower judges to
reduce the breadth of the interpretations that appellate judges adopt, but it
might also contravene the appellate judges' preferences, erode the authority of
the senior courts, and permanently increase their workload. Appellate courts
would not only have to decide whether to overrule the distinctions but they
would also have to review the cases falling within the newly distinguished
factual pattern in those instances where a distinction might not be overruled.
Furthermore, career judges' opinions are practically always written as if
different interpretations of the law are not open for consideration. The
interpretation segment that constitutes the major part of common law opinions
is entirely absent from civil law opinions. The practice of jumping from facts to
application and conclusion characteristically puzzles common law jurists.
Judges in a recognition system realize that their careers do not depend on
analogous minutiae of their judicial performance. Thus, they are free either to
shirk their judicial work or to use their judicial work to enhance their welfare.
Because shirking implies shrinking from notice and memory, people who have
[7:205
2000] Discretion in Career and Recognition Judiciary 213
reached the acclaim necessary to become judges in recognition systems may be
sufficiently induced not to shirk."
Judges who choose to promote their welfare will use their opinions to
obtain power, gratification, and prestige, a fact long recognized by the
literature. The malign interpretation of this would have the judges playing a
hold-up game, impeding the goals of the legislature and the executive unless
they appease judges. The benign interpretation would have judges pursue
prestige in at least three arenas: intellectual, donative, and also physical.
Intellectual prestige may be pursued by aggressive questioning of advocates,
and by writing opinions that inspire citation by other judges and by academics.
A path to citation, of course, is the production of differentiation, in other
words, the detailed distinguishing of facts and rules in which common law
judges excel. Moreover, intellectual prestige is furthered by the appearance of
handling comfortably the complexities of the legal system, which in turn
suggests displaying those complexities, if not contributing to them by further
distinguishing. Thus, in contrast to career judges' incentives not to innovate,
recognition judges have affirmative incentives for innovation.
Recognition judges' donative motives are satisfied when their
interpretations promote social welfare. This would imply care for reputation
outside the legal profession. Also, judges have an incentive corresponding to
legal realism: to focus on the consequences of the application of the law even if
at the expense of internal logical consistency of the legal system. Thus,
recognition judges have a disincentive to practice formal interpretation.
Prestige can also be acquired through the physical setup of the courts.
Grand buildings, imposing architecture, and majestic interior design should be
expected to a greater degree in the recognition than in the career judiciary, as is
in fact the case. The robes, wigs, and oral proceedings of common law courts,
which from a continental standpoint are quaint and leisurely, conform to this
point.2 Moreover, satisfaction can also be ,derived from procedure. Titles,
deference by the members of the bar, elaborate procedure presided upon by
judges and determined by exercise of their discretion should also be expected to
a greater extent in the recognition judiciary.
11. This is a point repeatedly echoed in Judge Posner's writings. See, for example, Posner, Overcoming
Law at 1-168 (cited in note 2) and Posner, Cardozo:A Study in Reputation (cited in note 9).
12. The grandeur of the common law trial also corresponds to one of the means Posner considers that
judges use to promote their welfare, the spectator aspect of the judge. Posner argues that judges enjoy trials
the same way a spectator enjoys a good play. See Posner, Overcoming Law at 126-35 (cited in note 2).
Posner's argument does not directly explain how the spectator experience differs between recognition and
career judges. Indirectly, of course, one can find Posner's argument consistent with the observed differences.
The greater power that recognition judges wield results in their satisfying this desire more fully than career
judges fulfill theirs.
214 Roundtable
In sum, recognition judges will have grander physical settings, more
elaborate and discretionary procedure, be more concerned about the impact of
their interpretations on society, and have stronger incentives for distinguishing,
for elaborating the grounds for their interpretations, and for innovative
interpretation than their career colleagues.
B. THE SENSE OF COLLEGIALITY
It is important to note that in both systems a strong sense of collegiality is
possible. Collegiality, however, is likely to find different expressions in the two
systems, particularly in the type of group that feels the collegial bond. Given
the likelihood of prolonged service at the same court and the small likelihood
of promotion, in recognition systems collegiality is likely to be stronger among
the judges of the same court and weaker among all judges compared to career
judiciary collegiality. The collegiality of the career judiciary is shaped by the
comparably frequent movement of judges between courts and by the existence
of parallel career tracks, in the civil as opposed to the administrative judiciary,
for example. Thus, the collegiality of the career judiciary should not be as tied
to the particular court and should be stronger within the branch of the
judiciary that corresponds to each career path (for example, collegiality within
the civil judiciary, as opposed to the administrative judiciary).'"
The most obvious expression of collegiality in the recognition system is the
reluctance to overrule previous decisions, particularly those of the same court.
Overruling undermines prestige and may lead to retaliation by other judges in
the form of reciprocal overruling. As a result, recognition judges have
developed an uncanny skill for distinguishing fact patterns from the facts that
have led other judges to reach their prior holdings." The result is an often
13. It is interesting to note a conflict in which the German Constitutional Court prevented the German
supreme court, which deals with civil and criminal matters only, from applying discretionary jurisdiction.
See Cappeletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective at 50 n 135 (cited in note 7). The interaction
of recognition (which might be the case of the German Constitutional Court, members of which are
appointed by the legislature) and career judges in a single system is a fascinating topic for further research.
14. Circuit courts of appeal do not seem reluctant to diverge from others in their interpretation and
thus create a circuit split. To the extent collegiality does not run to the other circuit courts, it may not
influence splits at all. To the extent both courts gain exposure and prestige for having created the split,
collegiality may even induce splits. Given the contradictory effects, conclusions about the effect of
collegiality on splits must await further study. When different supreme courts of a career jurisdiction (for
example, the supreme court on civil and criminal matters and that on administrative matters) create a split,
analogous incentives may apply. In at least one case in Greece such a split was engineered, however, to push
the dispute to yet another conflict-resolving supreme court, which the government expected to be more
favorable to it than the supreme court of the branch of the judiciary that had jurisdiction over the dispute
originally. The dispute was about the constitutionality of the law that restructured the Hellenic Universities,
various provisions of which were held unconstitutional by the administrative supreme court, Symboulio tes
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schizophrenic case law, that from reluctance to overrule preserves obviously
wrong theories or develops exceptions that swallow the rule. 5 A beneficial side
effect to this reluctance to overrule is that in addition to preserving the prestige
of each judge, it promotes the prestige and the mystique to the entire legal
system. The message it conveys is that judges are objectively applying the law
instead of subjectively interpreting it; judges do not make errors, and decisions
thus appear to have much greater permanence and influence than they actually
have. This, of course, further promotes the prestige of the judge and the legal
system.
Collegiality in the career judiciary finds very different expressions. I have
already mentioned the reluctance of career judges to distinguish between
factual patterns with minor differences. When junior judges avoid
distinguishing the dispute before them from a dispute that has led to precedent
by a higher court, they may be motivated by deference and a wish to reduce the
higher court's load. When a judge in the career system, however, finds
undesirable precedent of an equal or lower court, the judge's incentive to
distinguish is mitigated by the ramifications of distinguishing; distinguishing
conveys a signal of willingness to innovate which may not help a judge's career
and it creates workload, whether to reverse or to observe the distinction. With
distinguishing, collegiality is more likely to be put aside and reversals to take
place. Junior judges realize this and shun innovation, saving prestige because
they are not overruled, reducing the senior judges' workload, and providing
senior judges with additional prestige and authority. Senior judges will neither
need to reverse, nor decide whether to adopt a distinction, nor decide whether
to distinguish. Moreover, they benefit from the knowledge that their opinions
are more likely to be followed and are, in fact, followed. Thus, collegiality leads
to lack of innovation in the career judiciary.
To the extent that higher court judges derive satisfaction from reversing
lower courts, collegiality may also mitigate this incentive to reverse, particularly
in the recognition system. Reversing is a risky proposition for higher courts,
even if they do not feel collegial toward lower courts. Lower court judges can
Epikrateias decision nos 2786, 2787, 2788, 2805, 2808, 2811 (1984), some of which are reproduced at 10
Syntagma 566, 586, and 646 (1984). Thereafter a labor action was instituted, subject to summary
procedures, and a direct appeal to the civil supreme court was taken, which held the law constitutional,
Arcios Pagos decision no 1314 (1984), 10 Syntagma 674 (1984). The conflict-resolving court found the law
constitutional, Anotato Eidiko Dik. decision no 30 (1985), 11 Syntagma 182 (1985).
15. If one agrees with this impression of the American common law, I must note that it also contradicts
Ronald Dworkin's view that judges treat the law akin to a chain novel, writing the best opinion as
constrained by the previous ones. Given judges' ability to overrule prior opinions, they could produce a
much more logically coherent and aesthetically pleasing legal system by eliminating the contradictions and
distinctions that infest the system. See Dworkin, A Matter ofPrinciple 158-62 (Harvard 1985).
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retaliate against reversals by ignoring or distinguishing and circumventing the
new rule the higher court sets, forcing the higher court to engage more cases,
reverse them, and overrule the distinctions.'6 Not only are career judges less
likely to stage such an insurrection because of their incentives for docility, but
such a threat would also tend to be less effective in the setting of a career
judiciary. Given the additional work that such retaliation would cause to the
higher courts, we should expect larger high courts to have the capacity to
handle it more effectively. Since career judicial systems seem to be correlated
with larger and more numerous highest courts, they can cope with the
additional reversing that may be necessary to enforce their policies, because of
both the reduced incentive for insurrection and the increased capacity of the
highest courts to quell the insurrection.
C. THE CONTEST AND SELECTION AMONG JUDICIAL CANDIDATES
The attributes that both career and recognition judicial systems reward in
judgeship candidates are also diverse and multiple. Candidates in both, of
course, must excel, but in a different way and perhaps to a different degree.
Differences in the degree of excellence required for a judicial appointment
will consist of the percentile of juridical talent that is likely to receive a judicial
appointment. Whether judges will be distributed in the top 5% or 50% of legal
talent will depend on factors independent of the career or recognition character
of the system, as well as on factors that may be related to that choice. The ratio
of judges to lawyers in each legal system, which will have nothing to do with
the existence of a career or a recognition judiciary, may depend on formalities
such as a limitation for selection of judges from the ranks of barristers in the
U.K. or from bengoshi in Japan. But it will also depend on how many other
16. A characteristic example of such retaliation by a lower court in the U.S. legal system is Epstein v
MCA, 126 F3d 1235 (9th Cir 1997), withdrawn and superseded on reh'g 170 F3d 641 (9th Cir 1999).
Matsushita made a tender offer for MCA. Some shareholders of MCA had claims based on federal securities
law as well as claims based on the corporate law of Delaware, where MCA was incorporated. A class action
started in federal court over the federal claims, and another began in Delaware courts over the Delaware
claims. Matsushita and MCA reached a settlement with the Delaware plaintiffs, which also disposed of the
federal securities claims. The litigation pending in federal courts was then summarily dismissed on motion
of Matsushita and MCA. The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit as having unconstitutionally withheld "full faith and credit" from the state court proceeding
(the confirmation of the class settlement). On remand, the Ninth Circuit managed to return to its original
position in favor of the plaintiffs. It found that the state procedure violated the plaintiffs' constitutionally
protected right to "Due Process." In order to reverse again, the Supreme Court would have to engage at
least one new question, the Due Process in state law settlements of class actions, which is likely to be much
more contentious than the original "full faith and credit" issue. Of course, the Supreme Court would not
reverse the Ninth Circuit by completely insulating state court settlements of class actions from Due Process
attacks.
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top eligible jurists desire to become judges, which, in turn, depends on the
attractiveness of a judicial appointment. Judicial appointments will be of
different subjective value to different individuals, but their average appeal will
depend on both the tangible and intangible benefits associated with the
position. Tangible benefits, including salaries, material and administrative
support, staffing, and the quality and location of the courts and private
chambers of the judges influence the material calculus. Effectively this will
consist of the judiciary's budget and its endowment in the form of courtrooms,
offices, and libraries. Intangible benefits would include the prestige judges
enjoy, as well as the power and influence that they wield. Thus, if we accept
that the career judiciary does not produce as much prestige, does not allow as
much innovation, but induces judges to follow precedent more rigorously than
the recognition judiciary does, we should expect the intangible benefits of
career judges not to compare favorably on average with the intangible benefits
of recognition judges.
One might expect that the way to compare the attractiveness of judgeships
in two jurisdictions would be to compare the tangible benefits in the two
jurisdictions and how far from the top legal talent is the group which joins the
bench (what percentile, in other words, of legal talent does the bench
represent). If two jurisdictions offer different tangible rewards to judges but
attract the same percentile of the legal talent, one might think that the
jurisdiction that provides fewer tangible rewards becomes equally attractive by
offering larger intangible rewards. This would still be simplistic, however. The
rewards of a career in practicing law and in the academy must also be compared
and the cost of living in the two jurisdictions must be adjusted. We must also
adjust for other factors, such as the ease of admission to the bar, the output of
law schools, the nepotism that may exist in the legal profession (more nepotism
would prevent able upstarts from attracting clientele and would make
alternative legal careers more attractive) and so forth. A rigorous quantitative
study of these factors is necessary before we can start drawing conclusions
about the comparative power and prestige of the judiciary of different
jurisdictions.
Like most reputation contests, the prestige of the judiciary will have a
feedback effect'7 that will favor the judiciary of older and more stable
17. The cascading effect of school reputation is well known. Consider, for example, the following quote
on Harvard Law School from the turn of the century-
An institution which has any legal prestige and power, will make a money profit by
raising its standard, and that either at once or in a very short time. Its demand for greater
attainments on the part of its students will be quickly responded to, and this improved
class of students will in a marvelously short time so increase the reputation and influence
of the institution as to make its privileges and its rewards more valued and more valuable.
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jurisdictions. As groups (such as schools, professions, etc.) compete for prestige
in order to attract prestigious and powerful members, the group that succeeds
in attracting the top candidates will find its prestige increased by its success.
This, in turn, will make it easier to attract the top talent, because joining the
group or profession will be seen as increasingly prestigious. If this infinite spiral
never ends, then the prestige of the judiciary will depend on how old the
jurisdiction is. But even if this process has an endpoint, where for the given
structure of tangible and intangible rewards an unchanging percentage of top
legal talent considers the judiciary attractive, each jurisdiction may approach
that steady state very gradually and with differing speeds. Old jurisdictions,
such as England or its ex-colonies (which may have inherited judicial prestige),
will have more prestigious judiciaries compared to new jurisdictions, such as
newly created countries or countries whose legal systems were radically
restructured after the end of the World War II or the Cold War.
The attraction of a judgeship may have only a quantitative effect, in that it
will influence what percentile of the top legal talent finds the bench attractive.
Thus, it may not be directly relevant to judicial discretion, unless the different
qualitative ranks of the legal profession tend to have a different capacity for
exercising judicial discretion and creative interpretation. The signals that
judicial candidates should send in order to be selected for appointment may
have a more substantive influence on the nature of the judiciary. This factor
appears clearer in the case of the recognition judiciary. Simple demonstration
of analytical powers is not enough. Candidates for the recognition judiciary
must be palatable to the executive and legislature that may appoint or confirm
them and have the appeal (as distinct from prestige) that makes them desirable
candidates compared to others of equal analytical powers or of comparable
achievements. For candidates for the career judiciary, the process is very
different. The selection process is usually an examination, perhaps followed by
special study. This selection system will tend to emphasize encyclopedic and
technical knowledge rather than the desirability of the candidate's general legal
and political philosophy. Moreover, career judges are selected at an early age
when personal legal and political philosophies have not yet crystallized.
Therefore, analytical prowess may be enough for appointment to the career
bench, which may have important ramifications.
To analyze the pre-appointment incentives of candidates for the
recognition judiciary, we must not necessarily assume that a strong party-line
Charles Warren, 2 History of the Harvard Law School 397 (Lewis 1908). See also Thorstein Veblen, The
Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities by Business Men 98-123 (Hill &
Wang 1957). For a more recent and deeper elaboration, see Russell Korobkin, In Praise of Law School
Rankings: Solutions to Coordination and Collective Action Problems, 77 Tex L Rev 403 (1998).
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political past is an asset. Not only might the political system operate under a
tacit agreement not to appoint extremists (in which case only centrist party
associations would be a plus),"8 but in a system where confirmation and
nomination is decided by bodies that may be controlled by different parties
(something that may be a unique feature of the American legal system),
appointees must be bipartisan enough or centrist enough not to incite
resistance by the confirming authority. Perhaps it is the very fact that both
parties must have a level of comfort with the appointees that adds to their
appearance of impartiality and hence to their authority, power, influence, and,
due to the apparent objectiveness of their selection, to their prestige. Such
effects may be absent from common law jurisdictions with parliamentary
systems that are not conducive to divided party control of the legislature and
the executive or in which the nominating authority may depend on
maintaining fragile coalitions in the legislature by appeasing splinter groups (as
may be the case in Israel).
In essence, the politically appointed federal judges of the United States
must show preeminence in their field without inciting either party to block
their nomination, yet be politically attractive enough to the nominating party
to get the nomination. It is not surprising that this system is said to reproduce
the status quo by allowing only those who agree with the status quo to become
judges.'9 However, an amicable equilibrium will not always obtain. Recently,
the nomination and confirmation process has been so politicized that the Chief
Justice of the United States, William Rehnquist, has gone on record citing the
shortage of judges and the necessity for action by the Republican-controlled
Senate, which was delaying nominees of the Democratic President." Moreover,
some believe that in the nominations after Robert Bork, the apparent trend has
been for the executive to look for candidates who have not expressed their
opinion directly enough to provoke an attack by the other side. Thus, the odds
of nomination for judges and practicing lawyers have increased, while the odds
of nomination for academic lawyers, who consider part of their job an
obligation to analyze and opine on controversial legal topics, have decreased. If
one thinks that academic lawyers' study of interpretation and the social
18. Indeed, Democrats argued that the nomination of Robert Bork for the Supreme Court by President
Ronald Reagan violated such an arrangement, as did the Republicans about the nomination, albeit to a non-
judicial post, of Lani Guinier by President WFilliam Clinton. See J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling
(In)Dependence of Courts at 728 (cited in note 5).
19. See, for example, Suzanna Sherry, All the Supreme Court Really Needs to Know It Learned from the
Warren Court 50 Vand L Rev 459, 477 (arguing that neutrality is an illusion used to perpetuate existing
hierarchies, presumably including the neutrality of judges).
20. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Senate Imperils Judicial System, Rehnquist Says, NY Times Al (Jan 1,
1998).
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ramifications of rules would lead them to exercise desirably more discretion,
their reduced potential is unfortunate. Since this is a recent phenomenon, we
cannot know whether it will be short-lived. In the vortex of cross-currents, few
effects are clear. The political process will reflect strongly on the selection of
judges. A political or prosecutorial background is a plus. Extreme positions
reduce the individual's chances for appointment. However, after the
appointment is made, since judges will tend to have had high profiles, they are
unlikely to be passive. Effectively, despite the centrism and silence that the
system imposes before the appointment, the types of individuals it selects are
unlikely to follow precedent blindly. The selection biases of the career judiciary
are quite different.
The career judiciary often admits candidates through some central
examination. Thus, because it admits its candidates without regard to their
political views, it is free from selection biases similar to those of the American
judiciary. A formal examination could, perhaps, weed out political undesirables
if it were personal and sensitive to political attitudes: if it were oral instead of
written, corrected with knowledge of the candidate's name, with questions that
invite policy-based interpretation as opposed to simple application and
technical interpretation. Japan, for example, is a career system that has a desire
to weed out political undesirables but does not do so. Ramseyer's evidence that
Japanese judges who had joined left-wing organizations were placed on an
inferior track could be interpreted as evidence of Japan's inability to filter
appointments according to the candidate's political positions.' A system that
filtered by political conviction would not have made those appointments. Of
course, given the narrow interpretation that dominates legal thinking in career
judiciary jurisdictions, it is also likely that the nominators of judges never
thought that prospective judges' political views were relevant in judging. They
may have never thought to attempt to filter by political conviction.
Examining judicial candidates on technical skill also reinforces the
mechanical application of the law that is popular in career judiciary
jurisdictions. The candidates compete on their spectrum of legal knowledge,
and on their ability to apply precedent faithfully. Thus, it is likely that social-
policy minded jurists, who would interpret on the basis of social need, would
find themselves being outscored in the examination by jurists who tend to
apply rules mechanically. Thus, one could expect ex ante the career judiciary to
select judges who will display less independence and innovation than the
recognition judiciary, which tends to select high profiles who are unlikely to
become passive after their appointment.
21. See Ramseyer and Rasmusen, Judiciallndependence in a Civil Law Regime (cited in note 3).
[7:205
Discretion in Career and Recognition Judiciay 221
In sum, the selection effects suggest that the recognition judiciary will tend
to exercise more discretion because it is not selected based on its adherence to
precedent, but would have less variation in its views because it has a greater
capacity to weed out political undesirables. The recognition judiciary's greater
prestige will also tend to attract stronger legal talent to the bench, which may
also suggest greater capacity for discretion. Recognition systems may also tend
toward greater discretion by virtue of the appearance that the approval of
judicial philosophies by the selection process licenses judges to exercise them,
again with the caveat that judicial philosophies will tend to be centrist, at least
in the United States.
1V. CONCLUSION:
JUDICIARY STRUCTURE AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION
To conclude, I discuss the policy recommendations for which this study
argues, assuming a jurisdiction wants either to increase or decrease the level of
discretion that its judiciary exercises.' From the above discussion it should
follow that the more mechanical application of the law, to which the career
judiciary is induced and for which it is selected, means that the rules
implemented by the legislature will be applied with less scrutiny, on average,
than if they were being applied by recognition judges. This gives the legislative
branch a greater ability to direct the legal system in a career jurisdiction.'s By
contrast, the recognition judiciary, particularly the federal judiciary of the
United States, is likely to exercise its discretion sweepingly. Contrary to fears
that the unaccountable judiciary will reduce social welfare (by repeating the
dark-according to most-chapter of Lochnerism'4), the judiciary has shown
22. I have argued that the continuous change of the legal system that results from judicial independence
is desirable in Georgakopoulos, Predictability and Legal Evolution (cited in note 6).
23. It is interesting to note that judicial control of the constitutionality of statutes is also more limited
in the career judiciary legal systems. See Georgakopoulos, Predictability and LegalEvolution (cited in note
6). France and Germany use special constitutional courts, in the case of France constitutional challenges are
limited in time and standing. Id at 476. Since in many jurisdictions where courts routinely review the
constitutionality of laws their power to do so was assumed by the courts directly, the fact that courts in
many jurisdictions do not exercise this power may well indicate a docile judiciary. By the same token,
however, the power to review the constitutionality of statutes allows more room for judicial discretion.
Litigants have more arguments available to them about the applicability of the rules surrounding the
dispute. Courts have more ways to find that they are not bound by the legislature's pronouncements on the
topic, that they are in a first impression area, and exercise judicial discretion. Therefore, one could easily
add to the recommendations of this article that judicial independence also requires general constitutional
review of statutes by the judiciary.
24. In the latter part of the Nineteenth Century and the first of the Twentieth, the implementation of
labor legislation was blocked by courts that considered mandatory maximum working hours-and other
such provisions-infringements of workers' freedom of contract in violation of the Due Process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The most famous opinion in this regard is Lochner v New York, 198 US 45
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the capacity to implement welfare-increasing social change that a majority-
dependent government cannot. The most apt example is considered to be the
area of civil rights for minorities in the Fifties and Sixties. The integration of
the public school system that was achieved with Brown v Board of Educaton,"5
for example, can either be considered a measure that the majority desired but
feared to implement for its short-term costs, or a measure that would vastly
increase the welfare of a minority with little discomfort for the majority. In
either case, it was a welfare-increasing measure that a majoritarian legislature
would not take. Only an independent judiciary would introduce such
measures. It is important to remember, moreover, that no judiciary can enforce
its rulings and, hence, is somewhat constrained by the public opinion that
backs the executive. Furthermore, mechanisms can develop which can keep
judges in touch with current social needs and realities. Such examples from the
United States system are interventions by amici curiae, student-edited law
reviews, and the hiring of recent law graduates as judicial clerks. An amicus
curiae may submit a brief and, perhaps, participate in oral argument even
though the party submitting it is not a part of the dispute. This allows parties
influenced by the outcome to be heard in the process of reaching the decision.
Student-edited law reviews ensure the publication of non-traditional legal
pieces and social sensitivity is one of the editorial parameters. The youth of law
clerks ensures that judges see a sample-biased and narrow as it may be-of a
younger generation that has not yet been socialized into legal practice: the
group, perhaps, within the legal profession that is most likely to carry opinions
and preferences corresponding to those of the general population. Perhaps the
United States judiciary was assisted by such socially-sensitive institutions in
avoiding a repetition of the intransigence that it displayed in the early part of
16this century and the latter part of the previous one.
(1905), which Archibald Cox argues "symbolize[s] an era of conservative judicial intervention" that sought
to arrest change. Cox, The Court and the Constitution 131 (Houghton Mifflin 1987). The notoriety of the
Lochner opinion stems from Holmes' famous dissent that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics," 198 US at 75.
25. 347 US 483 (1954). For the argument that the courts (and, more specifically, constitutional
interpretation) protect minorities, see John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrnust: A Theory ofJudicial Review
135-79 (Harvard 1980).
26. A recent journalistic account gives an interesting example of such an influence. In an article that
recounts the changing standard in First Amendment interpretation that is moving away from strict
separation of church and state toward equal treatment of religion, the New York Times focuses on the
career of Professor Michael McConnell, a leading advocate of equal treatment of religion that would allow
prayer in public schools and vouchers that could be used for religious schools. A brief account of his
influence as a clerk to Supreme Court Justice William Brennan shows the influence that clerks may have:
"McConnell's first contribution to dismantling the wall of strict [church-state] separationism came during
his Supreme Court Clerkship in 1981, when he helped persuade Justice Brennan to review Widmar v.
Vincent." Jeffrey Rosen, Is Nothing Secular?, NY Times, Magazine Section 40 at 43 (Jan 30, 2000). In
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If, nevertheless, a reduction of judicial discretion is desired in a recognition
system, it could be achieved by means of adopting some of the attributes of the
career system. Judges should only be appointed to higher courts from the lower
courts, perhaps even on a pure seniority system. This would also revoke the
apparent license to exercise one's judicial philosophy. A norm that judges
should be selected from a narrow subset of the legal profession, such as
litigators, would tend to reduce judicial discretion, as would the requirement of
a technical examination. Discretion would also tend to be reduced by placing
impediments on judges' realizing their prestige. A norm of unsigned opinions
would prevent judges from achieving recognition and enjoying reputation; a
revocation of their authority to determine trial procedure would have a similar
effect, as would the implementation of trials by record, as opposed to oral
trials.
If a legal system were to subscribe to the notion that increased judicial
independence and discretion is desirable, the aspects of the career judiciary that
need adjusting are apparent. The power to transfer judges, the frequency and
great likelihood of promotions, and the examination of technical legal skill for
the admission to the judiciary are at the source of the docile nature of career
judges.' The transfer issue is the easiest to cure. Most constitutions include the
statement that the judiciary is an independent branch of government. Such
clauses should be interpreted as directly prohibiting transfers of judges by a
different branch, executive or legislative. Given the importance that neither the
threat nor the appeal of transfers motivate judges, the constitutional
requirement of an independent judiciary should be further interpreted to imply
that no transferring authority is constitutional, even if that power lies with the
judiciary.
The likelihood of a promotion makes career judges seek it by not
displaying independence. This effect may be harder to cure because it would
require a major restructuring of judicial administration in most career
jurisdictions. A constitutional amendment will most likely be needed to reduce
Widmar v Vincent the District Court had upheld the prohibition of use of state university property for
religious worship or teaching at the University of Missouri at Kansas City. The Supreme Court interpreted
the First Amendment to require that religious and non-religious speakers be treated equally. Widmar v
Vincent, 454 US 263 (1982).
27. Independence also requires that courts have the authority to check the constitutionality of statutes.
See Georgakopoulos, Predictability andLegalEvolution (cited in note 22). This can be implemented directly
by the courts by adopting the general constitutional principle that courts must control constitutionality.
Such an argument has been preempted by the design of the constitution in jurisdictions such as France and
Germany, which have special constitutional courts. If a constitution contains such a mechanism, courts
must still assume the power to control constitutionality because its control cannot be limited, as well as
because the power to control constitutionality is a component of judicial independence that most
constitutions directly mandate.
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the number of highest courts. The reduction of the number of judges in the
highest courts may be easier, as should be the reduction of the number of
appellate judges. This reduction may be particularly problematic in
jurisdictions where appellate courts try the facts de novo. A possible solution
may be the creation of a new appellate level. Thus, a jurisdiction that had three
levels of courts, first instance, de novo appellate, and supreme, would divide its
supreme court into an appellate review and a final review, neither of which try
the facts de novo. Since most supreme courts are likely to have some process
for review, this change may be a comparatively simpler matter. The final review
should be made by a court of discretionary jurisdiction consisting of just a few
judges (a small panel of the highest court, perhaps) who are appointed to the
panel for life.
Finally, independence seems to be fostered by the appointment of
accomplished jurists to the bench, particularly at the appellate and highest
level. The further a system can move from examinations and the closer it can
move towards a meritocratic appointment process based on previous
accomplishments, the likelier would be the appointment of jurists who would
seize the opportunity for independence.
A cautionary note, however, is in order. Discretion may be exercised in an
undesirable way, decreasing social utility. It is important that legal systems
develop institutions that provide a gentle incentive for judges to stay with the
times. Specific recommendations cannot be made because of the context-
sensitive nature of the problem. In some societies, a desire for positive
reputation may be enough to inhibit reactionary judges. An active and non-
formalistic legal academia with its legal journals and publications may be
enough to create a market in reputation that will motivate judges. Young legal
assistants, modeled after the American institution of judicial clerks, may also
help. Judicial awareness of the social utility function will be more difficult to
develop than judicial independence. Independence can be had, because judges
would naturally develop it, if their incentives for narrow following of the
higher courts were removed. Institutions to induce social responsibility other
than the amicus curiae intervention cannot be designed without intimate
knowledge of the details of each jurisdiction's institutional structure. It is
impossible to say whether such institutions will take the shape of their
American counterparts, with their reliance on judges' own desire for
reputation, or along entirely different lines, such as intra-judiciary reviews by
the junior judges of senior judges' work, independently or in connection with a
promotion to the supreme court, or other feedback by social groups on
prospective opinions or on judges' work. Those institutions will embody the
proper exercise of democratic means to influence a truly independent judiciary,
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the authority of which, after all, rests with the social welfare that its opinions
create.

